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Abstract
We study evolutionary games in real social networks, with a focus on coordination games. We find that populations fail to
coordinate in the same behavior for a wide range of parameters, a novel phenomenon not observed in most artificial model
networks. We show that this result arises from the relevance of correlations beyond the first neighborhood, in particular
from topological traps formed by links between nodes of different degrees in regions with few or no redundant paths. This
specificity of real networks has not been modeled so far with synthetic networks. We thus conclude that model networks
must be improved to include these mesoscopic structures, in order to successfully address issues such as the emergence of
cooperation in real societies. We finally show that topological traps are a very generic phenomenon that may arise in very
many different networks and fields, such as opinion models, spread of diseases or ecological networks.
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Introduction
Understanding interactions among people and their social
contacts is a key issue for the comprehension of the manners in
which society works and how everybody’s welfare can be
improved. This problem is related with, but not limited to, the
emergence of cooperation in human and animal societies [1,2] as
well as in other contexts (e.g., the formation of multicellular
organisms or their organs [3]). A mathematical tool that has led to
many deep insights about interactions among individuals is game
theory, particularly in evolutionary form [4–6], as it allows to
formulate in quantitative terms the most important prototypical
social interactions, such as conflicts and/or dilemmas [7]. To
apply this tool to understand social human behavior, the proper
setting is to specify what is the network of relationships [8–10]
among the intervening agents. We thus arrive at evolutionary
game theory on graphs, one of the most intriguing dynamical
processes on networks and one that is currently receiving a lot of
attention [11,12]. In this context, a great deal of research has
considered the Prisoner’s Dilemma [13] on artificially designed
model networks as the paradigm to understand the emergence of
cooperation, and a plethora of results have been obtained
concerning the positive or negative influence of networks in
sustaining cooperative strategies (see [11,12] for recent reviews).
Subsequent research on wider classes of games has provided a
more accurate view of the intricate relationship between
population structure as given by model networks, strategy update
dynamics and type of dilemma [14–17]. However, real social
networks may have features (such as, e.g., hierarchical levels of
organization or communities) that are not well captured by model
networks and that may have an important effect on the emergence
and evolution of cooperation. Thus, in spite of its original aim,
evolutionary game theory on graphs has not addressed the
problem of cooperation in human societies in a sufficiently realistic
manner yet.
In view of this, among the necessary ingredients for a realistic
model of social interaction, we here focus on improving the
description of the underlying interaction network. To that end we
use real social networks as the substrate on which the model games
will be played, our aim being to scrutinize the incidence of the
topology on the evolutionary outcome. It is important to note that
studies restricted to the Prisoner’s Dilemma [18,19] have already
reported that different social networks with apparently similar
characteristics can lead to largely different behavior. To gain a
deeper insight on the effect of the network, we enlarge the range of
possible social interactions to consider. As we will see, this allows
us to pinpoint coordination games such as the Stag Hunt (see
below) as the proper microscope to probe the details of the
network. Thus, we show the emergence of coordination failures
and uncover the mechanism behind it: topological traps
connecting different groups of nodes in regions where redundant
paths are scarce, which turn out to be responsible for the failure of
global coordination in the network. It is important to note,
however, that our findings are relevant much beyond the realm of
the social sciences. As we will argue in the concluding discussion,
topological traps may be present in many real networks that
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 December 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 12 | e15210exhibit different types of slowing down or even stopping of
dynamical phenomena, in a very similar manner to the one we
have found with coordination games.
Results
Games on social networks
As a realistic approach to modeling social behavior, we have
used two social substrates obtained by sampling real relational
data. We have chosen these substrates instead of other social
network data available, such as the IMDB network for actor
collaboration in movies or scientific collaboration networks,
because their links are defined through true personal exchanges.
In contrast, in those other data links are defined by joining the
collaboration framework (movies, research projects, articles, etc.),
which does not necessarily imply mutual interaction. Our first
substrate is a social network obtained from the email traffic
between members of the University Rovira i Virgili (in Tarragona,
Spain), where nodes represent individual email addresses and
undirected links between two nodes indicate bidirectional
communication (at least one email in each direction) [20]. Our
second real social substrate consists of nodes representing users of
the ‘‘Pretty-Good-Privacy’’ encryption algorithm, where links
trace trust relationships between those persons who sign each
other’s public keys [21]. For a comparison of some of their
statistical properties see [18].
Regarding the interaction among agents, we consider a wide set
of 262 social dilemmas. They consist in games with 2 players who
choose between 2 strategies and with no difference in role. While
by no means this is the most general scenario of interaction
between individuals, understanding binary interactions is a first
and crucial step towards dealing with more complex, n-ary
settings. Games are defined by the following payoff matrix
CD
C
D
1 S
T 0
  
,
ð1Þ
where rows represent the strategy of the player who obtains the
payoff and columns that of her opponent, player and opponent
being any of the two individuals. Strategies are labeled C and D for
cooperate and defect, because we interpret the game as a social
dilemma. Restricting the values of the coefficients within the
intervals 21,S,1a n d0 ,T,2, we have the Harmony game (HG
from now on) [22] (0,S, T,1) and three classic social dilemmas:
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (21,S,0,1,T,2), Stag Hunt (SH) [23]
(21,S,0,T,1),and Snowdrift (SD)[24] (also called Hawk-Dove
[25]) (0,S,1,T,2). Each game corresponds, thus, to a unit
square in the ST-plane, which in turn corresponds to a specific
tension context in the social interaction under consideration [26].
Indeed, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the reference game in much of the
published work on this issue, poses a very demanding scenario on
cooperation, subject to both the temptation to defect and the risk in
cooperation[26].TheStagHuntgame,however,islessproblematic
in the sense that it is a coordination game dominated by the risk in
cooperation alone, or in other words, by the question of trust. Note
that in PD the conflict is between individual rationality and mutual
benefit, whereas in SH one player’s rational choice depends on her
beliefs about what the other will do. In addition, there are situations
that apparentlycorrespondtoa PDwhichareinfact bettermodeled
by means of a SH. This is the case, for instance, when the PD is
repeated and the players have in mind the ‘‘shadow of the future’’
[27], i.e., the possibility of future interactions, or for psychological
reasons [28],or elsewhen group selectionis takeninto account [29].
In addition, we also include the Snowdrift game, which isolates the
other tension present in PD, namely the temptation to defect,
avoiding the undesirable consequences of being defected upon,
because in SD mutual defection becomes the worst case scenario.
We have carried out simulations of the evolution of populations
playing these games and embedded in our two real social
networks, PGP and URV. See Methods for a detailed description
of the simulations.
Cooperation in 262 games
In Fig. 1 we present the results of the asymptotic (or stationary)
cooperation density obtained from the simulations in the PGP
network, the URV email network and a randomized version of the
PGP network. The general appearance of the results resembles
those found in highly heterogeneous or scale-free networks [14],
with a large increase of the cooperation level in the SD quadrant
(note that the numbers appearing in the plots over or below each
quadrant represent the average value of the cooperation level in
that quadrant). The most salient feature, however, arises from the
comparison of results on the PGP network with those on the URV
network: the PGP network shows a smooth transition in the SH
quadrant (bottom left), from cooperation to defection, which to the
best of our knowledge has never been reported with model
networks [11,12]. This transition is observed both under the
replicator rule and the unconditional imitation rule, which implies
that this is not a consequence of the presence or lack of
stochasticity in the dynamics. We have also verified that this
result is asymptotic, in the sense that longer simulation times do
not change it, and that it does not result from an average over
realizations with asymptotic homogeneous states (all cooperators
or all defectors), but all realizations with the same parameter set
end up with very similar heterogeneous outcomes. This is certainly
an striking result, as it means that there is a wide range of game
payoffs in which the population ends up in a mixed-strategy or
polymorphic state, without converging to one of the two Nash (also
evolutionary) equilibria of the basic game. Therefore, this is a true
characteristic of the evolutionary outcome of coordination games
on the PGP network, which makes it different from both mean-
field or well-mixed population results and from all model networks
studied so far, and whose origin we have to unveil. Furthermore,
as Fig. 1 shows, this effect disappears when the original network is
randomized, by rewiring it while preserving the degree of each
node, following a procedure introduced in [30]. Notice also that
the anomalous heterogeneous states appear around the sharp
transition where the population is expected to behave in a bistable
manner, so that the effect mostly takes place in the region of SH
and part of PD games. Finally, the fact that the URV network
shows only a small region of coordination failures, and that its
randomized version does not give rise to significant differences
with the original one, suggests that the phenomenon we are
reporting on the PGP network is deeply engraved in the details of
the topology, in so far as their global characteristics are similar.
Coordination failures
This initial observation leads us to concentrate our study on the
explanation of the continuous transition observed in the SH
quadrant with the PGP network, when coordination failures appear
and the differences with the asymptotic behavior observed on model
networks are dramatic. We focus on the diagonal S=-T, and study
the evolutionary outcome with selective rewirings of the original
network, which allow us to activate or deactivate correlations for
high or low degree nodes (see Methods). The results of this analysis
are reported in Figure 2. It shows that the selective deactivation of
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rewirings that preserve not only the degree distribution, but also the
degree-degree correlations, make the smooth transition disappear
almost completely, reducing the range where coordination failures
are observed to a very narrow one around T=0.6. On the contrary,
if the rewiring preserves the three-node correlations, the result is
practically the same as on the original PGP network, even though
the number of rewirings is still significant. To shed further light on
this phenomenon, we resorted to randomizations in which only
nodes with degreesmallerthan orequal to a given one wereaffected
by the rewirings. In this case, Figure 2 shows that these rewirings
mostly affect the T,0.6 region, bringing more and more nodes into
cooperation. Importantly, the plot also shows that it is enough to
work with nodes of degree 7 or less (see purple line on right panel of
Fig. 2) to suppress most of the coordination failure region.
Admittedly, these nodes represent a large portion of the network
(more than 80%, see inset of Fig. 2B). However, the quantity to
assess the amount of rewiring performed is the distribution of stubs,
i.e. of half links that emerge from each node. The inset of Fig. 2B
shows that the stubs of nodes with degree 7 or less account for less
than 50% of the total amount.
Topological traps
To understand and explain the above results, it is important to
recall the evolution of coordination games on model networks. As
it was shown in [16], the evolution of coordination games on
degree homogeneous networks (e.g., lattices or random homoge-
neous networks) proceeds in two stages: an initial one in which
isolated cooperators disappear whereas regions with high local
density of cooperators engulf their defector neighbors and form
compact clusters, and a subsequent stage in which these clusters
grow and end up making the whole population coordinate in the
cooperative equilibrium. This second stage takes place for an
appropriate parameter region (along the restriction line S=-T,i t
ranges around the interval 0.5,T,0.7, depending on the specific
network of choice). Therefore, there must be a mechanism
preventing this two-step process to take place in the PGP network.
We believe that such mechanism arises from the combination of
two main features: degree heterogeneity and scarcity of redundant
paths, which altogether give rise to topological traps for the
propagation of the cooperative strategy. As a simple example, let
us consider the configuration displayed in Fig. 3, with a link
between two nodes of different degrees k1.k2. Let us assume for
the moment that node 1 is a cooperator with all the neighbors
except node 2 being cooperators, and node 2 is a defector fully
surrounded by defectors except for node 1. For the two dynamics
we are considering here, the strategy of a given node changes
(under unconditional imitation) or can change (under the
replicator rule) only if it has a neighbor with larger payoff. In
this case, node 2 becoming a cooperator requires k1.T2S+1. If
Figure 1. Cooperation maps for different values of S and T show coordination failures on the PGP network. Asymptotic density of
cooperators for 2|2 social dilemmas on the URV (left), PGP (middle) and degree-preserving randomized PGP networks (right). Top row:
Unconditional imitation rule; bottom row: replicator rule. In the upper left quadrant of each panel we have the Harmony game (0,S, T,1), in the
upper right quadrant the Snowdrift game (0,S,1,T,2), in the bottom left the Stag Hunt game (21,S,0,T,1), and in the bottom right the
Prisoner Dilemma (21,S,0, 1,T,2). Numbers above and below each quadrant represent the average value of the cooperation level in the
quadrant. Note the anomalous smooth transition in the PGP network (middle column), which indicates the existence of coordination failures. For
comparison, the URV network shows a very small region where coordination is not achieved, comparable to the results of model networks. The
randomized version (not shown) gives essentially the same results as the original network, indicating the absence of peculiar features in its topology.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015210.g001
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and node 1 is a defector, then cooperation spreads when
k2.T2S+1. Therefore, we see that if k1.k2, i.e. when there is
degree heterogeneity, for some range of game parameters
cooperation can spread from node 1 to node 2, but not vice
versa. This implies that ‘‘coordination waves’’ will not propagate
over the network uniformly and, when there are no redundant
paths available, they will not reach certain regions of the network.
On the other hand, for games such that the evolution of the
population does not feature these coordination waves, the effect of
topological traps is not expected to take place. Accordingly, the
heterogeneous states which are found with the PGP network, and
which are lost when the network is randomized (see Fig. 1), mostly
occur for SH and PD games.
Figure 4 presents some examples of topological traps that we
find in our study. We assume that the cooperators that are shown
as squares in the plots are frozen and connected to a group of
cooperators such that the payoff coming from the part of the graph
not shown is k (i.e., they have k cooperative neighbors, or a set of
cooperators and defectors such that the net balance is k). To begin
with, panel A shows a branch linked to cooperators. For the two
dynamics we are considering here, the strategy of a given node
changes (under unconditional imitation) or can change (under
proportional update) only if it has a neighbor with larger payoff
(i.e., players do not make mistakes). In this case, irrespective of
what node 1 did at the previous round, at the next one (under
unconditional imitation) or eventually (under proportional update)
it will adopt the strategy C. This in turn implies that node 2, if
originally a defector, can only change to cooperation if T,1+S.
Note that this is also the case if node 2 is a leaf or it is connected
only to defectors, as well as in many other cases. Therefore,
strategy C will not be able to propagate further from 1 to 2 and
beyond. The situation in Fig. 4B is similar, but in this case the
condition for cooperation to propagate to nodes at position 2 is
T,1+2S. Because S,0 we arrive at the conclusion that
cooperation has even more difficulties to propagate along
bifurcations, the situation becoming worse the larger the order
of the bifurcation. Finally, our third example, shown in Fig.4C,
illustrates the fact that propagation of strategy C can also be
difficult in situations other than branches. For this particular
example, nodes of type 1 will be cooperators if k.4S (k. (n22)S
(in case of a n-clique with two outwards connections), whereas
nodes of type 2 will remain defectors unless T,1+2S, as in the
bifurcation case above.
It is important to realize that, considering these structures as
isolated ones, they will be frozen forever, no further evolution
being possible with our learning rules, which do not allow for
mistakes or innovative exploration of strategies. It can be shown,
however, that for best response dynamics [17,31–34], which is a
innovative rule, similar parameter regions with coordination
failures arise. On the other hand, in actual networks such as the
PGP, there will be many different types of mesoscopic structures
similar to those presented here. This will in turn induce a number
of different thresholds of the form T,1+nS, so that different
topological traps will yield to the propagation of clusters at
different values of T, leading to the smooth transition we observe
Figure 3. Topological traps are obstacles to the growth of
clusters of equal strategists. A simple example is a link between two
nodes of different degrees, connected to all cooperators (in red) or all
defectors (in blue). See main text for a discussion.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015210.g003
Figure 2. Effect of correlation-preserving rewirings on the evolutionary outcome, along the parameter diagonal S=2T (SH
quadrant). Panel A: Stationary density of cooperators as a function of T, for substrates constructed by rewiring the PGP network but preserving
degree correlations up to the indicated order. We observe that the smooth transition, which characterizes the coordination failure in the PGP
network, disappears when degree correlations of order 3 are destroyed, indicating that the origin of this phenomenon is related to such correlations.
Panel B: Influence of bottom-up rewirings. Black and green symbols correspond, respectively, to the original PGP network and a randomized version
preserving degree correlations up to order 2. Symbols in other colors correspond to intermediate cases, where only nodes with the indicated degrees
are rewired. We observe that the change between the extreme cases (sharp vs. smooth transitions) depends on the degree of the nodes involved in
the rewiring process. Inset of Panel B: normalized cumulative distributions of number of nodes (blue circles) and number of stubs (green squares) vs
node degree k, of the PGP network. Nodes of lower degrees are the majority, but their stubs represent a much smaller portion in the total network.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015210.g002
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arising from degree heterogeneity and lack of redundant paths, is
further supported by the analysis presented below. As it is shown
there, the PGP network has a structure consistent with our
interpretation, in so far as most of its nodes are in non-redundant
paths, whereas this is not the case with the URV network. In
addition, we have also verified that when rewirings are restricted
to nodes connected to nodes of larger degree, and only in this case,
coordination failures disappear, thus pointing again at topological
traps as the mechanism behind the phenomenon.
Unveiling the structure of topological traps
The examples considered in Fig. 4 point directly to the
mechanism of topological traps. In all three examples, we see
that the wave of cooperation stops at nodes playing a bridging role
and that are linked to other nodes with a higher degree. This
immediately leads to a testable hypothesis on our two social
networks: Given that coordination failures are a much more
general phenomenon on the PGP network than on the URV one
(where they hardly exist at all), there should be many more nodes
of this class in the former than in the latter.
First we tested the occurrence of bridging nodes sitting on
unique paths for cooperation to spread. Specifically we focused on
nodes that are not in 2-components. A 2-component is a subset of
nodes with every node connected to 2 or more nodes of the set.
Nodes that are not in 2-component are, therefore, embedded in a
tree-like region, where there is no path redundancy allowing the
spreading of cooperation to circumvent topological traps. Figure 5
shows that, although this kind of nodes is present in both networks,
they are by far more common in PGP.
Second, in order to check the influence of degree heterogeneity,
we carried out a new set of rewirings. We began by rewiring only
those nodes that have at least one neighbor with greater degree,
i.e., nodes i that satisfy kivmax kj
  
, j[Ni (recall that Ni is the
neighborhood of node i). This is done by (1) randomly finding a
node which complies with this condition, (2) randomly finding any
other node with degree ki, and (3) interchanging any two
neighbors of them. Note that this rewiring preserves the 2K-
distribution, while operating only on nodes of specific degrees.
With the so rewired networks, we considered the same line in the
SH quadrant, focusing on how the cooperation level was affected.
Panel A in Fig. 6 shows that it is certainly enough to operate on
this particular kind of nodes to remove coordination failures, in a
similar way as it is displayed in Fig. 2B. On the other hand, we also
checked that the complementary set of nodes, i.e. those that verify
ki§max kj
  
, j[Ni, has a much slighter effect on the cooperation
level. It is interesting to note that some effect cannot be avoided
because any single rewiring actually affects four nodes and hence it
can incidentally reconnect a low-to-high degree link.
The additional analyses described here confirm that coordina-
tion failures are caused by the two topological features that we
have pinpointed above: differences in degree between neighboring
nodes and lack of redundant paths, which altogether give rise to
topological traps that prevent the spreading of coordination.
Clustering and topological traps
Both networks studied, PGP and URV, have some clustering
[20,21], i.e. there is some number of closed triangles of links
between three nodes. In addition, triangles are very closely
related to the 3K-distribution [35], which is precisely the order of
degree correlations needed to preserve the existence of
topological traps. Thus, an interesting question is to which
extent clustering itself plays a role in this phenomenon. On one
hand, it is virtually impossible to affect the degree distribution of
clustering without changing the degree correlations of order 3,
and vice versa. On the other hand, it is possible to randomize a
network in a way that destroys correlations of order 3 but
preserves the total number of existing triangles (see Methods).
Figure 4. Characterization of the robustness against invasions
for different topological structures. Shown are three example
cases: A, a branch, B, a bifurcation, and C, a clique. Nodes indicated by a
square with a C enclosed are assumed to be locked in a cooperative
strategy due to their large number of connections to other cooperators
(not shown).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015210.g004
Figure 5. Bridging ties are the origin of coordination failures. The PGP network has many more tree-like structures than the URV network.
Shown is the fraction of nodes that are not in 2-components for both empirical networks. Clearly, they are much more frequent in the PGP network
(panel A, left) than in the URV (panel B, right). This is in agreement with our claim that they are responsible for the observed effect, as discussed in the
main text.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015210.g005
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used above. Panel A displays the distribution of clustering per
degree Ck, whereas panel B presents the the stationary state of the
population. It is clear that the rewirings that preserve correlations
to order 2 (and destroys those of order 3) remove the topological
traps, independently of the amount of triangles in the network.
Notice also that the rewiring that maintains the number of
triangles reduces the clustering for low-degree nodes, something
completely in agreement with the analysis presented above. Very
remarkably, clustering manifests itself as a displacement of the
transition between the two homogeneous population states, an
effect that has been reported for other network topologies which
feature clustering, namely regular lattices and small-world
networks [16].
As an additional proof of the irrelevance of clustering for the
phenomenon under discussion, Fig. 8 presents the simulation
results for Baraba ´si-Albert scale-free networks of average degrees
k=2, 4 and 8. This network topology features very low clustering
(strictly zero for k=2), while it yields strong coordination failures
for k=2, but none for k=4ork=8. Again in agreement with our
analysis, the case with k=2 is the only one that, besides high
heterogeneity in degree, exhibits lack of redundant paths between
nodes.
Discussion
As we have seen, social dilemmas on real social networks may
exhibit largely different outcomes from those expected from model
Figure 6. Targeted rewirings verify the degree profile of nodes involved in topological traps. Rewirings are applied separately to two
complementary sets of nodes in the PGP network, namely those ones connected to at least one other node of higher degree (panel A) and all the
rest, i.e. those ones with a degree equal or larger than that of any of their neighbors (panel B). In both panels thick lines correspond to the extreme
cases: The original PGP network (black) and a network where all the nodes that satisfy the condition were rewired (green). Thin lines represent
different intermediate cases defined by the degree of the nodes affected by the rewirings (see legends). We observe that coordination failures are
strongly prevented in A but only slightly in B, supporting our claim that the former set of nodes are the ones involved in the reported phenomenon.
See Methods for more details on the randomization procedures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015210.g006
Figure 7. Clustering is irrelevant to topological traps. Clustering distribution per node degree k (panel A) and stationary density of
cooperators x* as a function of game parameter T (panel B), for the PGP network and some rewirings presented in Fig. 2, along with a rewiring which
preserves correlations of order 2 (and breaks those of order 3) while maintaining the total number of triangles in the network (see legend). Both
rewirings that destroy correlations of order 3 suppress coordination failures, irrespective of the large difference in clustering. Notice that the rewiring
which preserves the number of triangles only removes clustering from nodes of low degree. This removed clustering logically corresponds to the
correlations of order 3 that are relevant to the reported phenomenon.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015210.g007
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with each other (as we have done with URV and PGP networks)
but the comparison to model networks is most dramatic. A
particularly striking and relevant feature arises in the case of
coordination dilemmas, where certain networks, such as PGP,
show coordination failures for a wide range of parameters, i.e.,
network regions are not able to coordinate on one of the two
equilibria, leading a subset of individuals to dissatisfaction or
frustration (the use of the word ‘frustration’ here is not unrelated to
the manner in which it is employed in physics, for instance when
speaking of antiferromagnetic Ising models or spin glasses, where
many ‘spins’ cannot find a low energy configuration due to
opposite sign interactions [36]). This phenomenon is observed
even in the strongest case of the PD, where the range of
parameters in which a high level cooperation is achieved is also
affected, as the comparison between randomized and original
networks shows (cf. Fig. 1).
A detailed analysis of the topology of the PGP network has
allowed us to conclude that coordination failures arise from certain
mesoscopic structures, more concretely from bottlenecks or
topological traps that prevent the Pareto-efficient equilibrium
from propagating to the whole network, effectively leading to a
disruption of the information flow. The key features of these
mesoscopic structures is the existence of nodes connected to nodes
of higher degree, which find it difficult to induce neighbors to
imitate their strategy, and the lack of redundant paths to
circumvent those topological bottlenecks. The fact that the PGP
network has many more of these structures than the URV network
corroborates that they are responsible for the very different
behavior we have found in the simulations. By the same token, the
URV example shows that coordination failures are not necessarily
observed on every real network, although, as we will argue below,
the mechanism behind the failures seems to be quite general. In
fact, this mechanism can also explain the results in [33], where
small networks were exhaustively studied by numerical simulation
and it was found that failures of coordination, not frequent in the
sizes they studied, were related to segmentation and lack of
centralization of the networks. On the other hand, the appearance
of these mesoscopic structures is related to the community
structure [37–39] of the networks. As it was discussed in [18],
the PGP network consists of scale-free-like communities loosely
interconnected, whereas the URV network is formed by
communities which are almost complete graphs which in turn
are connected almost to every other one (cf. Fig. 2 in [18], where
the existence of the topological trap structures in typical PGP
communities can also be appreciated). Therefore, a community
analysis of a given network can provide a first indication as to
whether it is going to exhibit coordination failures or not, although
it must be realized that communities themselves may contain inner
topological traps which could prevent them from coordinating in a
unique equilibrium (as seen also in [34]).
Topological traps can indeed be a very general feature, arising
in contexts related to different social issues. Thus, Castello ´ and
coworkers [40,41] have observed similar structures giving rise to
long-lived metastable states of coexistence between languages in a
population or, in other words, making consensus more difficult in
opinion models. While their model cannot be exactly mapped to
ours for several reasons, such as the larger number of states or the
kind of strategy update dynamics, the phenomenology is quite
similar and the structures we have considered here are also
identified as key factors to their findings. Another instance where
topological traps may play a role is the propagation of sexually
transmitted diseases, which has been shown [42] to be slower
when the bipartite nature of the network is taken into account; it is
clear that topological traps similar to those considered here arise in
a very natural manner in bipartite networks and they should
certainly contribute to slowing down the transmission process.
Similar phenomena can hence take place in other bipartite
ecological and organizational networks [43]. In addition, meso-
scopic motifs very similar to those considered here are also found
in other contexts, such as communication [44,45] and metabolic
[46] networks; in this last case, considering the effect of such
bottlenecks may be relevant to understand their extraordinary
robustness.
In view of all these largely different examples, we envisage that
topological traps will have important, non-trivial effects in almost
all dynamical processes on networks, going from physical and
biological to social and economical applications. This has crucial
implications in two directions. First, it becomes clear that
modeling actual networks with artificial models may be missing
topological features as the ones we are discussing here and as a
consequence lead to inaccurate results or predictions. A word of
caveat is in order here: as we have seen in the case of the URV
network, not all real networks exhibit topological traps. Therefore,
there may be instances in which currently available model
networks are adequate enough so as to account for the behavior
of the system. What we claim here is that the presence of
topological traps is a key feature which, when present, leads to
highly nontrivial consequences. The discussion above shows that
this phenomenon may arise in many real networks, and hence one
should check their existence when observing anomalous behaviors
on a given system. Indeed, it is particularly interesting that the
reported behavior is rooted in degree correlations of order three
(next-nearest neighbors), a feature whose reproduction is out of
reach for most model networks. In this regard, it would be very
interesting to study whether networks arising from co-evolutionary
dynamics [47–49] exhibit this kind of structures (the persistence of
defector hubs on networks arising from a PD game is a hint in this
direction [50]). Second, the effect of these bottlenecks in the
propagation of consensus or the diffusion of information must be
kept in mind when designing networks for specific purposes, such
as, e.g., innovation networks, albeit they might be useful to block
Figure 8. Synthetic heterogeneous networks (Baraba ´si-Albert
scale-free networks) only give rise to coordination failures
when there is lack of redundant paths. Stationary density of
cooperators x* as a function of game parameter T, for three instances of
Baraba ´si-Albert scale-free networks with degrees k=2, 4, and 8 (see
legend). Redundant paths between nodes are only scarce for the case
of k=2, which is strictly a tree by construction. Notice also that
clustering is very low in all three cases (mean value ,0.01). Network size
is N=10
4 nodes, network generation parameters are m0=m=k/2 [54].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015210.g008
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Methods
Topological null cases: Randomizations
To understand the effects of mesoscopic structure, we have
compared the results on the PGP network with those obtained
with several randomized versions of it. The most common
randomization found in networks’ literature follows the rewiring
procedure proposed in [30]. The process consists of choosing
randomly two nodes and exchanging one neighbor of each node
(also selected randomly), which preserves the degree of each node
and destroys degree-degree correlations between nodes. If the
network has a well defined community structure, this process
ensures its dilution. However, one can go deeper in the
randomization process and preserve more quantities that just the
degree of each node. In [35] the authors propose new rewiring
strategies that preserve not only the original degree distribution
P(k) (for simplicity 1K -distribution), but also the joint degree-
degree distribution P(k, k’) (2K-distribution) and the P(k, k’, k0)( 3 K -
distribution), etc. The idea is basically the same that the one
followed to rewire preserving the 1K -distribution. When
increasing the order of the correlations to be preserved, the
selection of the rewired nodes is more restrictive. For example, to
preserve the 2K -distribution, there must be at least two nodes of
equal degree adjacent to the nodes in the edge pair. Then,
preserving the nK-distribution means preserving all degree
correlations up to order n. Generally speaking, increasing the
number of correlations to be preserved shrinks significantly the
possible rewirings and eventually for some nK-distribution the
rewiring is impossible. We applied this rewiring method to the
PGP network, whose limit turns out to be the 4K-distribution.
Indeed, using a rewiring preserving the 3K-distribution, the
resulting topology, after more than 10
4 randomizations, is almost
identical to the original one, in particular its community structure.
Here we propose a refinement of this kind of rewiring, which
allows the screening of the topological characteristics in between
the 2K -distribution and the 3K -distribution, in order to unravel
the contribution of specific topological patterns to our results, and
in the form of a partial 2K -rewiring. The idea is to also control the
degree of the nodes involved in the trials of the edge pairs to be
rewired. We can restrict the degree of the nodes that will
interchange edges to any value between 2 and a greater number.
For instance, we start with a rewiring that preserves the 2K -
distribution but only nodes of degree 2 can participate in the
process. This rewiring will thus break 3K correlations for nodes of
degree 2. The process can be iterated increasing the allowed
degrees, i.e. for degrees 2 and 3, for 2, 3 and 4, etc. Alternatively,
one can proceed from the other end of the degree range, fixing the
largest degree dm and adding progressively lower values: dm –1 ,dm
–2 ,dm – 3, etc. Note that both strategies are complementary, but
not equivalent.
The rewiring conceived to study the relevance of clustering in
topological traps proceeds as follows: First, a pair of links to be
shuffled is found according to the 2K -distribution preserving
algorithm mentioned above. Then, the number of triangles of
which the links are part is computed, for both cases before and
after the shuffling. If the number is the same, then the rewiring is
actually performed.
Simulations
All the simulations were performed for an initial density of
cooperators x
0=0.5. The update of strategies was done synchro-
nously: all the individuals in the population play the game once
with all their neighbors, compare payoff with them and decide the
new strategy for the next time step, following one of the two rules
described below. Then, they all update their strategy at once and
their payoffs are set to zero before the next step. In addition, we
have verified that asynchronous update leads to very similar
results. The time of convergence in the simulations was T=10
4
steps. If the population did not reach full cooperation or defection,
an average of the cooperator density during the last tenth of the
time evolution is taken as the asymptotic cooperator density for
that realization. The studied region in the ST-plane was sampled
in steps of 0.05. For each point in the resulting 41641 grid, which
corresponds to a concrete game, 100 realizations were performed
to obtain an average value of the asymptotic density of
cooperators. Each realization started from a newly generated
population, with strategies randomly assigned.
Our first evolution rule for strategies is the replicator rule or
proportional imitation rule [51,52]. The replicator rule is
implemented as follows: let i=1…N label the individuals in the
population. Let si be the strategy of player i, pi her payoff and Ni
her neighborhood, with ki neighbors. With the replicator rule one
neighbor j[Ni is chosen at random. The probability of player i
adopting the strategy of player j is given by
pt
ij:P st
j?stz1
i
no
~
pt
j{pt
i
   .
Wij, pt
jwpt
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0, pt
jƒpt
i ,
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with Wij~max ki,kj
  
max 1,T ðÞ {min 0,S ðÞ ½  to ensure that
pt
ij[ 0,1 ½  .
As a second strategy update rule, we have considered another
imitative rule that has received attention in previous research
[11,53], namely unconditional imitation. It makes each player
choose the strategy of the neighbor with largest payoff, provided
this payoff is greater than the player’s one. This is a deterministic
rule, in contrast to the replicator update rule, which is stochastic,
and therefore it is a good reference to assess the influence of
stochastic effects on our results. In addition, we have verified that
results are similar with other imitative rules, such as the Moran
rule [12].
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